This evening's discussions centered on two sections from the second chapter of Love and Responsibility: "Sentiment and Love" and "The Problem of Integrating Love" (pages 109-118). Peter took a moment to remind the group that in chapter two, which is called The Person and Love, Wojtyla is exploring different analyses of love: first a metaphysical analysis (love as attraction, desire, goodwill, reciprocity and betrothed love); second, a psychological analysis (sense impression and emotion, sensuality, sentiment); and, coming up in the last section of the chapter, an ethical analysis (experience and virtue, choice and responsibility, freedom).

Sentiment and Love

"Sentimentality," Wojtyla asserts, "must be clearly distinguished from sensuality." Sensuality has as its object a sexual value residing in the 'body' itself as a 'possible object of enjoyment.' On the other hand, with sentimentality, the object of the emotional experience is not only the body but the whole person of the other sex; i.e., 'femininity' or 'masculinity'. Sentimentality is accompanied by affection -- the desire to be near the other, "to move in each other's orbit," as Wojtyla says -- and not the conspicuous drive for enjoyment as is so characteristic of sensuality.

Wojtyla observes that with regard to sensuality and sentimentality, "...there seems as a rule to be a marked difference between woman and man. .... It is pretty generally recognized that woman is 'by nature' more sentimental, and man more sensual. ...Now, this form of sensuality [the body as a possible object of enjoyment] is more readily awakened in the man, more readily crystallized in his consciousness and attitude. The very structure of the male personality and psyche is such that it is more readily 'compelled' to disclose and objectivize the hidden significance of love for a person of the other sex. This goes with the relatively more active role of the male in such love, and also imposes responsibility on him. Whereas in the woman sensuality is as it were covert, and concealed by sentimentality. For this reason, she is 'by nature' more inclined to go on seeing as a manifestation of affection what a man already clearly realizes to be the effect of sensuality and the desire for enjoyment. There exists, then, as we see a certain psychological divergence between man and woman in the manner of their participation in love."

With sentimentality, Wojtyla writes, the value of the beloved person grows enormously, as a rule out of all proportion to his or her real value -- an idealization of the object of love. Sentimental love influences imagination and memory and is influenced by them in return. "Sentimentality is subjective and feeds, sometimes to excess, above all on values which the subject bears within himself or herself, and for which he or she consciously or unconsciously yearns." Lynne commented that she thinks it is easier for a man to be interested in pleasure, whereas woman internalize and think about love in a more intangible sense, with ideal, romantic notions. Jackie reflected on how women, according to Dr. Alice von Hildebrand, are even in the physical sense (anatomically) receptive vessels. It is part of the modern culture for woman to pursue just as men pursue, but deep inside, women know and feel this is not part of their nature. Lynne added, " When I think sentimentality, I think of the poetry of the Brownings "My love is like a red, red rose..." and when I think of sensuality, I think of Benny Hill!"

Wojtyla continues to explain that sentimental love, in excess, can be a source of disillusionment or even feelings of hatred, when the discrepancy between the ideal and reality surfaces. It is not obvious, he says, whether the tendency to idealize the object in sentimental love is a strength or a weakness, although we know that by itself, as a form of reciprocal relationship between an man and a woman, it is insufficient. "It too needs to be integrated, as does sensual desire. If 'love' remains just sensuality, just a matter of 'sex-appeal', it will not be love at all, but only the utilization of one person by another, or of two persons by each other. While if love remains mere sentiment it will equally be unlike love in the complete sense of the word. For both persons will remain in spite of everything divided from each other... " Prof. Peter added that it is not a question of a woman becoming more like a man, nor a man more like a woman, but rather each becoming more "person," that is, without sentimentality coloring truth nor sensuality reducing the other to an object. "Vive la difference!" Peter said.

Oscar Wilde, as Prof. Peter reminded us, is famous for saying, "Woman are not to be understood; they are to be loved." But you have to understand us to love us, said Sylvia. We have to try to understand, grow in our understanding, but love, said Peter. Yet how can we truly understand anyone when we don't even understand ourselves? he asked. Prof. Peter clarified the Pope's phenomonological use of the verb "understand": by understand, he means being present to the other person, immediate self-presence, self-consciousness, instead of the notion of understanding/analyzing a problem. Wojtyla relates this to the Trinity, the love of the Son for the Father and the Father for the Son in a self-gift. It is an other- and a self-discovery.

Next, Wojtyla turns to those forces of the human spirit which make the integration of an objective love possible.

The Problem of Integrating Love

In this section, in very beautiful and profound words, Wojtyla embarks on a discussion of truth and freedom. "Truth," he says, " is a condition of freedom, for if a man can preserve his freedom in relation to the objects which thrust themselves on him in the course of his activity as good and desirable, it is only because he is capable of viewing these goods in the light of truth and so adopting an independent attitude to them. Without this faculty man would inevitably be determined by them: these goods would take possession of him and determine totally the character of his actions and the whole direction of his activity."

He continues: "His ability to discover the truth gives man the possibility of self-determination, of deciding for himself the character and direction of his own actions, and that is what freedom means." Wojtyla is again using a countercultural definition of freedom, which in today's modern society has in many respects come to mean "do whatever one wants to do or feels like doing." Truth, Wojtyla is saying, is the condition to make any choice. Prof. Peter explained that Wojtyla believes freedom involves a seeking of truth... one is not truly free unless one is trying to do the right thing. Cyrille commented that Wojtyla's perspective very much reflects the context of the oppressive postwar Communist regime in Poland. You are free, he is telling his people, because you can discern and choose good from evil and can "adopt an independent attitude." A government does not make a person free, but rather God does, through His gift of self-determination.

Wojtyla then ties freedom and truth to the integration of love: "The process of integrating love relies on the primary elements of the human spirit -- freedom and truth." Love, he says, is always an interior matter of the spirit, where will is the final authority in ourselves. The value of the person is bound up with freedom, and freedom is a property of the will. Love demands freedom -- that which does not bear the mark of a free commitment is not love. A truly free commitment of the will is possible only on the basis of truth, and the experience of freedom necessarily accompanies truth.

Love, Wojtyla underscores, also insists on objective truth. Only thanks to this, he says, only on this basis, can the integration of love take place. The full picture of love is its objective value, which Wojtyla promises to discuss further in the next section on the ethical analysis of love.